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Tina Chanter. The following introduction and paper is forthcoming in an issue of 
philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism, part of which is devoted to papers 




The following papers were presented at Kingston University’s London Graduate School 
Summer Academy, which focused in 2016 on Derrida and Gender. Prefatory to my own 
contribution, which asks how to live affirmatively as feminists, taking its inspiration from 
Derrida’s meditations on khōra, I will briefly introduce the other contributions. Both my own 
and Ewa Ziarek’s essay orbit, albeit differently, the symbolic authority of the law,	  
problematizing the terms in which Derrida characterizes those who come to represent the 
institution of Women’s studies within the university. Questioning Derrida’s suggestion that in 
one of its modes Women’s studies simply reproduces the law of the university, Ziarek asks if 
a feminist iteration of the law is ever simple, juxtaposing Kimberlé Crenshaw’s parables of 
the law with Derrida’s meditation on Kafka’s parable “Before the Law.” If professors of 
Women’s studies are in danger of becoming guardians of the law according to Derrida, 
Ziarek suggests that there are those whose invisibility prevents them from even becoming 
supplicants before the law, let alone its representatives. Although in plain sight, the 
racialization of the law remains invisible to those guardians of the law who are too blinded by 
their own privilege to see it. Ziarek suggests feminists and race theorists who interrogate this 
invisibility inhabit a new relation to the law. 
The binary law of gender is coming under increasing scrutiny by transgender scholars. 
Marie Draz attends to transgender theorists who resist diluting the fight against women’s 
subordination in the proliferation and remixing of genders. Showing why we need a 
transgender feminism that is not gender-neutral, Draz demonstrates that Derrida’s emphasis 
upon neutralizing gender opposition resonates with transgender theorists who diagnose 
hierarchies even as they push against the binary gender system. She thereby makes good on 
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Derrida’s critique of philosophy as phallogocentric. If our very conceptual system is 
relentlessly and thoroughly masculinist, there can be no truth of woman that does not 
capitulate to the phallogocentrism of binary, hierarchical gender categories that privilege the 
phallus as standard bearer of truth. Only if we render neutral the hierarchical opposition 
between the sexes in ways that contest the cisgender origin of the phallus as founding 
meaning, is it possible to proliferate gender differences in a way that does not reinscribe 
traditional sexism. An intersectional transfeminism must not only work against 
heternormative cisgender binaries, but also continue to dismantle the asymmetry between 
male and female, and the systemic hierarchies that structure racism, classism, and ableism. 
Focusing upon Derrida’s interpretation of femininity in Nietzsche, Verkek points out 
that while Nietzsche’s and Derrida’s embodiment of a feminine style might loosen up the 
fixity of gender in one way, in another way these male philosophers cast themselves as 
defenders of the cisgender system, by disciplining women to remain feminine while granting 
themselves the freedom to play with feminine roles, thereby becoming feminine. In doing so, 
they perpetuate a double standard, advocating polyvalence for themselves, while seeking to 
hold women to a standard of femininity that they themselves define. If woman functions as a 
trope for dismantling the coherence of a metaphysical system of truth, it is not enough for 
Nietzsche and Derrida to disrupt the binary gender system in becoming woman, while 
continuing to exploit their prerogative as male philosophers to dictate the options available to 
women. An approach to transgender is needed that both divorces gender from the material 
referentiality of the sex to which genders have traditionally been assigned, thereby disrupting 
the ostensible truths of the cisgender system for both genders, and at the same time refuses to 
endorse the phallus as the origin and guarantor of meaning, whereby any symbolic position is 
circumscribed in advance by masculine privilege. 
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Emily Apter’s appreciation of the undoubted importance Catherine Malabou’s work 
has acquired for a generation of scholars also addresses trans issues. She raises the question 
of whether the larger body of Malabou’s work implicitly pursues the question of sexual 
difference explicitly interrogated in her book Changing Difference. Apter succeeds in 
avoiding the dual trap of either reducing Malabou to a disciple of Derrida, or critiquing her 
for not being completely loyal to Derrida, acknowledging Malabou’s philosophical 
achievements, while also raising some crucial questions about the validity of her 
pronouncements on the question of gender and sexual difference, particularly around the 
issue of essence and ontology.  
Derrida, along with others, Paulo Freire included, has problematized the economy of 
the gift, making the point that even gratitude, even gratefulness, is liable to turn a gift into its 
opposite, drawing the gift into the very logic of exchange from which it sought to escape. 
Spinning a web of images that begins with the university as a beehive, Perry Zurn reflects 
upon how a university incarcerates us, how it grates on us. Pressing bodies that have been 
told they do not belong in the cross-hatched space of its disciplinary pigeon-holes into which 
we slot ourselves, like the zest of lemons passing through a giant cheese grater, we come out 
shredded. An abrasive grid of microaggressions leaves its mark on us as we persist in trying 
to fit our bodies into the beehive of the university. Weaving Derrida and feminism together in 
their refusal to simply file away knowledge in order to preserve, classify and systematize it, 
in meditating on the marginal, and in allowing marginalized voices to reverberate in spaces 
from which they have been banished, Zurn reflects on the impurities of being grateful. 
Kas Saghafi dedicates his memorial reflections to Pleshette DeArmitt, whose work on 
Derrida, among others, will be known to many readers of this journal. It is fitting to allow the 
memory of Pleshette DeArmitt, whose work has been inspirational for feminists, and for 
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which we remain grateful in the impossible sense that Zurn elaborates, to close this collection 
of essays devoted to Derrida and feminism. I leave Saghafi’s piece to speak for itself. 
   * * * * 
 
Derrida and Beyond: Living Feminism Affirmatively 
Tina Chanter, Kingston University, London 
That which goes beyond the oppositions “sensible” versus “intelligible” (K89), “material” 
versus “formal” (K99), “mythos” versus “logos” (K92), the “metaphorical” versus the 
“proper,” the “visible” versus “invisible,” “form” versus the “formless,” “icon” versus 
“paradigm” (K91), that which is neither “meaning” nor “essence” (K102), neither “object” 
nor “form” (K102), neither “body” nor “soul” (K103), neither “active” nor “passive” (K92). 
That which “gives place” (K99) to such oppositions but is not itself determined by them, that 
which is “[b]eyond categories, and above all beyond categorial oppositions” (K90). 
I refer to khôra, that which troubles polarity, that which is unnameable, 
untranslatable, uninterpretable, yet bearer of every interpretation. That which cannot be said 
to properly exist as determinate, since as Derrida puts it, “There is khôra but the khôra does 
not exist” (K97). Khôra is “excess” but as an excess that is nothing— “nothing that may be” 
and nothing that “may be said ontologically” (K99). Strictly speaking indeterminable. 
Lacking in properties that would function like “those of a determinate existent” (K97), khôra 
is “[a]morphous” (K95), enigmatic. 
Even the way I began is not strictly speaking accurate, indeed it is full of inaccuracy, 
misleading, aberrant. Errant. For it is not quite that khôra can be neither sensible nor 
intelligible, material nor formal, and so on, but rather that, “at times the khôra appears to be 
neither this nor that, at times both this and that” (K89). The only way one can begin to speak 
of khôra is in errancy, in full errant flow. Having already misspoken then is merely to have 
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committed an unavoidable fault, for one is always and inevitably too late to capture that 
which is khôra, which resists naming and determination but which enables, facilitates, holds 
in place all that is to follow, all that is to become and to be, all the oppositions Derrida names 
in an effort to specify how khôra is beyond them and yet precedes them all. It gives meaning 
to them all, it contains them, maintains them in their being and becoming, even in their 
mutual contradiction.  
“To have nothing that is one’s own”—isn’t this, asks Derrida, “the condition of 
khôra?” (K105). A place, or rather a non-place, of giving. We are within the strange, 
impossible, non-existent economy of the gift, since the true gift lacks any economy of 
exchange, recognition, calculation, or symbolic payment (see WB198). The gift must not be 
reciprocated or acknowledged in any way, since to do so would be to draw it back into the 
realm of economics. To recognize, even to thank with gratitude would be to fail to allow the 
gift to stand as gift. It would be to draw the excess of the gift back into the circuit of meaning 
from which it extracted itself in being a gift. So with khôra, to name is always to misname, to 
engage in catachresis. Khôra is a gift that gives nothing, but “gives itself” (Derrida 1987, 
175). With khôra we are perhaps, says Derrida, in a place “where the law of the proper no 
longer has any meaning” (K105). A place of “impropriety” (K97). A “neutral space” (K109), 
a place of a “third genus . . . a place without place, a place where everything is marked but 
which would be “in itself” unmarked’ (K109). A place of “effacement” (K116; see also K92 
and 110). A place of “welcome” (K111), marked only by the “gift of hospitality” (K111), a 
place of “chaos, chasm, khôra” (K112), a place of “enigma” (K113), a place of the 
“receptacle” (K117), a place occupied by a “strange mother,” one who “gives place without 
engendering,” one who is “Preoriginary, before and outside of all generation” (K124), one 
who is “older than the beginning” (K126). Khôra requires our discontent with the 
orthodoxies of binary oppositions that continue to orchestrate thinking. 
	   6	  
Derrida says, “Philosophy cannot speak philosophically of that which looks like its 
‘mother,’ its ‘nurse’, its receptacle’, or its ‘imprint-bearer.’ As such, it speaks only of the 
father and the son, as if the father engendered it all on his own’ (K126). His claim is a strong 
one. Philosophy as such—but it is of course the status of the “as such,” the question of 
inherence, necessity, what and what is not a priori, what and what is not transcendental, that 
is precisely in question. Philosophy, then, in its current configuration is in question, as 
phallogocentrism, as “the complicity of western metaphysics with a notion of male firstness” 
(C171). In “Choreographies,” his 1982 interview with Christie McDonald, Derrida refers to 
the matrix/womb, the container, imprint, locus of begetting (C164). Derrida does not name 
khôra here, he merely evokes khôra. Since khôra is essentially unnameable, this implicit 
reference is all the more palpable, as Derrida’s gestures signal khôra to those who will read 
them in a context to which khôra belongs in a way that is perhaps singular, given the subject 
matter of “Choreographies,” namely the birthing and rebirthing of feminism. 
 The context in which he fails to name this strange non-figure of the mother, of 
becoming, nurse of all beings, and yet in this very failure of language thereby succeeds in 
evoking khôra all the more effectively in her strangeness, is one in which Derrida comments 
affirmatively on the interrogation of the feminist movement by a dancer and a maverick. The 
condition that is put in question is the positive agenda that feminism assigned to itself in 
uncovering a silent history, a ‘silent past’ (C165), a history that had remained untold until 
Women’s and Gender Studies made it into the object of its study, a hidden history of 
women’s accomplishments that needed to be unveiled, exposed to the light of day, a history 
of women’s texts, art, poetry and literature, women’s scientific and philosophical 
accomplishments; a history of women’s names and legacies that establishes the crucially 
important contributions of women to all domains of knowledge, but that had lain dormant in 
the forgotten crevices of that which had passed for the official version of history until 
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feminists forged new symbolic narratives, contesting that which previously passed for the 
history of knowledge and discovery, imbuing these newly constructed narratives with the 
authority of institutions such as universities, and conferring upon them the capacity to 
circulate as legitimate knowledge, a knowledge that begun the proper naming of women. 
Despite the incalculable and ongoing symbolic importance of such gestures, which 
write women’s accomplishments into history for the first time, Derrida is interested in going 
beyond such initial gestures. It is in this project that he enlists the maverick dancer to whom 
Christie McDonald refers. The dancer is Emma Goldman, whose words McDonald quotes by 
way of opening the interview, “If I can’t dance I don’t want to be part of your revolution.” 
McDonald goes on to quote Derrida’s Spurs: “There is no such thing as the truth of woman, 
but it is because of that abyssal divergence of the truth, because that untruth is <<truth>>. 
Woman is but one name for that untruth of truth” (S51). Woman becomes then, for Derrida, a 
way of naming the concealing or withdrawing of truth, and thus also of the giving of truth 
anew. A way of naming (and thus also necessarily misnaming) khôra. 
Derrida is drawing upon Heidegger’s well known interpretation of aletheia as 
unconcealment (Unvergborgenheit), truth as unveiling, as that which hides itself, a 
meditation at the heart of his discussion of Nietzsche and Heidegger in Spurs. Against this 
background Derrida warns that the association of the feminine with truth should not be 
mistaken for “a woman’s femininity,” or “female sexuality” or “any other essentializing 
fetish” to which a “dogmatic philosopher” might resort (S55). Let’s put this warning side by 
side with a text in which Derrida reflects upon the nature of women’s studies as a discipline, 
and its relationship to the university. The transcript of a seminar held at Brown University in 
the Spring of 1984, “Women in a Beehive” refers to, among other texts, Derrida’s “Before the 
Law,” which scrupulously interrogates the nature of the authority of the law and the 
institution we call literature by meditating on Kafka’s parable of the same title. It is a text to 
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which Judith Butler refers in what has become canonical for gender studies, Gender Trouble. 
Kafka’s “Before the Law” concerns a man from the country who attempts to access the law, 
but who encounters difficulties he had “not expected” (BL183). Refused entry to the law by a 
doorman who, after the man from the country has stood for many years outside an open gate, 
through which the doorman says he must not enter, tells him it was meant only for him. 
At issue here is the invisibility of the law, the way the law obscures its own origins 
and authority, displacing itself, suspending itself as prohibition (see BL197), perpetuating 
itself as it effaces its very law-like character. “The law, intolerant of its own history, 
intervenes as an absolutely emergent order, absolute and detached from any origin. It appears 
as something that does not appear as such in the course of history,” says Derrida (194). The 
law “as such” is thoroughly intertwined with the law “as if” it were “spun from fiction,” as if 
it were a fantasy, ‘a myth, or a fable’ (BL191-99). Nothing bars access to the law but the 
symbolic authority that accrues to the discursive prohibition issued by one who takes it upon 
themselves to represent the law; in recognizing the authority of the law a subject produces 
themselves as a subject of the law. As Butler says, “juridical subjects are invariably produced 
through certain exclusionary practices that do not ‘show’ once the juridical structure of 
politics has been established” (1990, 2). The legitimation of law naturalizes its exclusionary 
operations in producing subjects. In doing so it renders such exclusionary operations invisible 
to the very law that thereby consolidates itself, to those who make themselves into 
representatives of the law, who manage to legitimize themselves as subjects in the eyes of the 
law. 
With this context in mind, we might ask ourselves what kind of event would occur 
with the establishing of a women’s and gender studies (WGS) programme. What kind of 
relationship is enacted with regard to symbolic authority, what kind of displacement, if any, 
is thereby taking place? If “the law figures itself as a kind of place, a topos” (BL200), what 
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topology is enacted in the founding of a WGS programme? In Women in a Beehive Derrida 
calls for a kind of feminism that does not restrict itself, as he puts it in a phrase that evokes 
his discussion in “Before the Law,” to producing representatives of Women’s studies who 
become “guardians of the law” (WB190. See also BL188, 201). To be restrictive in this 
sense, would be to slot women’s studies into the university structure as it already exists, 
without bringing into question that structure. Women’s studies would establish itself on the 
model of a department, just like the traditional disciplines, such as “literature, philosophy, 
anthropology, etc.” (WB192), by acquiescing to the authority of the university without 
attempting to establish for itself “a new relation to the Law” (WB192). Derrida refers 
explicitly to Kafka’s “Before the Law,” making the point that even if “one were to radically 
deconstruct the old model of the university in the name of women’s studies, it would not be 
to open a territory without Law—the theme of liberation if you like” (WB192). For 
deconstruction itself is just “another way of writing the Law” albeit an “affirmative” way, in 
the same sense that Kafka’s text “Before the Law” “becomes the Law itself” even as it 
rewrites and “deconstructs all the systems of the Law” (WB197).  
 While Derrida acknowledges the symbolic importance of women’s studies having 
established itself as a discipline that commands a certain measure of respect, and 
acknowledges the difficulties still faced by women’s studies programs struggling to gain 
institutional sanction, he also calls for something else, something more, something that goes 
beyond the excavation and exposure of a silent and repressed history. The uncovering of 
texts, the retrieval of marginalized voices, the archival work of bringing to light those whose 
texts, works, and speeches have been neglected, denigrated, maligned, unappreciated, 
misrecognized, and misrepresented has been, and continues to be—since we are not talking in 
purely historically progressive terms—an indispensable first stage. This first, conservative 
gesture is necessary step on the way, but it is not enough because it still adheres to a 
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progressive view of history that assumes a telos governed by the idea that there is a truth that 
woman is, only one truth, a truth that will be revealed by the guardians of women’s studies, 
the professors who have assumed its mantle of authority, who preserve, guard and police its 
truth. In the light of this truth professors of women’s studies conduct their research and 
inculcate their students, so that they too can profess the truth of woman, and can in turn pass 
on this truth to new generations of feminists. 
 Derrida acknowledges some of the profound difficulties at stake, conceding that to 
create a truth for women’s studies has been a necessary this first step, creating a platform 
from which to launch the discipline of Women’s Studies. Yet he is wary of all that this 
entails, not the least of which is a capitulation to all those dogmatic ideologies whose 
tenacious hold deconstructive philosophy has worked so hard to relentlessly interrogate, the 
ideology of the subject, for example. Derrida acknowledges that to insist that “women are 
subjects” is to “keep the philosophical axiomatics” of the “framework on which the 
traditional university is built,” yet also concedes that to “deconstruct the notion of 
subjectivity” could have “dangerously reactive” as well as “radically revolutionary or 
deconstructive” consequences (WB193).  To affirm the subjectivity of woman and to call for 
“equal rights” is to remain “caught in the logic of phallogocentrism,” it is to rebuild “the 
empire of the Law.” It is to acquiesce to the “notion of subject, of ego, of consciousness, soul 
and body, and so on” (WB193). So Derrida advocates that Women’s Studies should try to 
“undermine the very structure [we’re] trying to transform” (WB193), a gesture that carries 
with it a risk, precisely because it is in danger of co-optation by all the most conservative and 
reactive forces at work—and these are legion. 
A feminism that unproblematically situates itself within the philosophical domain 
commanded by the law of subjectivity would, in Derrida’s view remain “reactive”(C168). It 
would amount to “a specular reversal of masculine subjectivity even in its most self-critical 
	   11	  
form—that is where it is nervously jealous both of itself and of its ‘proper’ objects” (C166). 
It is worth noting here that the narrative that academic feminism has produced for itself, a 
narrative about the first, second, third and fourth waves of feminism, while it no doubt 
commands a certain pedagogical appeal, does in fact reiterate the progressivist narrative 
Derrida is putting into question. What then would it mean not to remain content with only 
this founding gesture of women’s studies, which organizes and dissects the women’s 
movement into neat phases, one of which superimposes itself historically on another, as if 
one succeeded another, as if this were a history of straightforward supersession, not unlike 
the tale of Spirit that Hegel tells in the Phenomenology of Spirit? What would it mean to go 
beyond establishing a canon and a linear history that would bring women’s studies into line 
with all the other disciplines one teaches at a university? 
To go beyond this necessary condition of women’s studies would be precisely to 
bring it into question. In Derrida’s words, it would be to embrace “a completely other history 
of paradoxical laws and non-dialectical continuities, absolutely heterogeneous pockets 
irreducible particularities, of unheard of and incalculable sexual differences” (C167). It 
would mean to dream a dream of the “innumerable” (C184). It would be to move beyond the 
suffocating binaries of sexual difference, beyond the suggestion that there are more than two 
genders, for it is not a matter of inventing a third, fourth or fifth, it is not a matter of counting, 
for gender and sexuality are as multifarious as are individuals. The need to respect singularity 
is what is at stake when Derrida evokes polysexual signatures (C183). We would need to 
embrace the ideas that some feminists, queer and trans theorists have already put forward, 
which complicate progressivist narratives, straightforward linear histories, and assumptions 
that sexuality could be catalogued and classified according to pre-given models of 
temporality and spatiality.i  
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Derrida is calling on representatives of Women’s Studies to embrace a risk, in calling 
for the kind of “undecideability . . . which is totally foreign to the realm of calculus, to the 
realm of opposition, to the realm of programming and so on” (WB195). He goes on to 
suggest that “you can use the force of [the term] woman” to suggest that “we could not even 
speak of ‘woman’ anymore” (WB195). On the one hand I am struck here by Derrida’s 
extreme prescience. For he sees the need not to homogenize women, by pressing them into 
the mould of woman. By emphasizing the importance of singularity against the background 
of his critique of phallogocentrism he understands the need to give not merely gender or 
sexual difference, but also race, class, ethnicity, nationality, age, ableism their due. He 
understands the need not to get mired in these labels, the need to think beyond them, for just 
like any other label or category, they too can become immobilizing straightjackets for 
thinking if you allow them to take over. As Caribbean-American poet, essayist, activist and 
pedagogue June Jordan said, 
I am reaching for the words to describe the difference between a common identity that 
has been imposed and the individual identity any one of us will choose, once she 
gains that chance. That difference is the one that keeps us stupid in the face of new, 
specific information about somebody else with whom we are supposed to have a 
connection because a third party, hostile to both of us, has worked it so that the two of 
us, like it or not, share a common enemy. What happens beyond the idea of that 
enemy and beyond the consequences of that enemy? (2003, 219) 
Labels remain imperative for political struggles, making spaces where identification can 
happen, facilitating bonds of recognition that create solidarity, community and friendship that 
are vital for psychic survival. Yet there are times when labels themselves get in the way, 
hampering thinking, just as there are times when the terms in which recognition unfolds need 
to be brought into question. We need both gestures that begin to happen under the sign of 
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labels and the discourse of recognition, even as they exceed those labels and that exchange, 
and gestures that bring into question the fixity and stability of labels, and the terms on which 
recognition takes place, since labels themselves are often imposed on groups, and recognition 
can consolidate and shore up the symbolic law. Labels often derive from and are implicated 
in disparaging and disabling discourses, so we must mobilize and re-signify them in creative, 
affirmative rather than reactive, negative ways.  
What complicates still more profoundly the difficulties Derrida acknowledges 
structurally is the affective dimension. As a feminist—and I want to explicitly acknowledge 
this is a different position from that of Derrida’s—I want to add something that I think is 
indispensable. It is this: if you have suffered harassment, bullying, intimidation, 
marginalisation or discrimination as a woman, if you have been stalked, raped, assaulted, or 
psychologically abused as a woman, you will know, and you will know viscerally, precisely 
what is at stake in the erosion of your subjectivity. You will know that as and when your 
subjectivity—onto which you desperately try to cling—is eroded by forces over which you 
have no control, all those voices that have authorized themselves as legitimate speech, voices 
issued in the name of the venerable institution that western philosophy has established for 
itself, will sound clamorous, and your capacity to distance yourself from their noise will be 
severely diminished. For those voices have aired themselves over the centuries, one after 
another, acquiring the authority and dogma of institutional recognition, bolstering up one 
another. From Aristotle on, these voices have told women that we lack the capacity for 
rational deliberation, that our intellectual capacity is weaker than that of men (Hegel), that 
our moral capacity is inferior to that of men (Kant and Freud), and so on through the ages. 
All of which is to say that when your subjectivity is eroded as a woman, it is no small 
matter, and you will discover, if you do not already know, that you can put your name to all 
the PhD theses or books in the world, but none of them will render you immune to those 
	   14	  
moments that you will feel deep down inside that what is happening to you when you are 
assaulted as a woman whether psychically or physically is somehow your fault. And even as 
some distant voice will whisper that you are feeling this because of the phallogocentric 
legacy etched into the very fabric, history and conceptuality of society, this will not alleviate 
the feeling at certain times that it is still somehow you who have failed, and not your abusers 
who have failed you, failed to accord you the dignity, respect, equality and humanity you 
deserve as a human being to be accorded. Given everything that has been said about the 
functioning of the law, it should not come as a surprise that we give ourselves the law (see 
BL203), that the symbolic law unconsciously inculcates itself in us. It is not that Derrida does 
not see or know this at some level. It is that its affective operation exceeds whatever could be 
said or known of it. 
 If you identify as a woman, and you are thinking to yourself, not me, I will never be 
discriminated against, marginalised or abused, I will rise above it; if you are thinking that you 
do not recognize the debilitating, dehumanizing and desubjectifying pain of which I speak, let 
me take a moment to congratulate you on your good fortune, but also to remind you of a few 
salient facts and statistics. There is no country in the world where women’s salaries are equal 
to men’s. Statistically then, the chances of you suffering professional discrimination are 
extremely high. So you would be misinformed if you think you are unlikely to suffer 
discrimination. And you would be forgetful if you did not remember that the reason you are 
able to sit or speak in university lecture halls with impunity, the reason you are able to be a 
student or professor is because women fought for you to be able to gain admission to 
university, just as women gave their lives for you to be able to vote. So if you do not think of 
yourself as a feminist, it might be time to think again. 
 My point is simple, but I believe it is also vital. The affectivity of feminism means 
that whenever anybody says that women need to distance themselves from the 
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phallogocentric discourse of subjectivity, with all its metaphysical trappings, a double gesture 
is required, just as much as Derrida rightly points out that a double gesture is required of 
feminism itself. On the one hand, yes, feminism needs to be wary of recapitulating the 
sanctimonious discourse that places the subject, the ego, and consciousness, with all its 
Cartesian certainties, at the centre of the world. Yet on the other hand, feminism needs to be 
wary of any gesture that tries too rapidly to, if not do away with, then certainly to 
problematize, the subject for the simple but profoundly important reason that subjectivity is 
sometimes still so tenuous for women—and not only for women, but for trans subjects, 
minority subjects, subjects who identify as having a disability—that it is in danger if not of 
eradication then certainly evisceration, simply through the daily grind of institutionalised and 
legitimised sexism, racism, transphobia, and ableism, through the harassment and 
discrimination that is built into the very fabric or society and institutions, which is often 
invisible to those who do not experience it.  
And in those moments when you are trying, and you feel like you are failing, to hold 
onto yourself in the face of these daily trials, when you are trying to hold yourself together as 
a subject, in such moments an appeal, whether deconstructive or not, to put into question 
your subjectivity will be less than helpful, because you will already be so fragmented, so 
scattered, so undermined and so disabled. You will already be trying to find the strength and 
will and peace of mind to hold together the subject that used to be you, and if you can just 
hold on long enough, with enough tenacity, and optimism, and determination to make it 
through, if you can just hold on that little bit longer, to see things through, you know you will 
become you again, although you will not quite be the you you used to be, you will have been 
fundamentally altered. It is precisely in those moments above all that the double gesture for 
which Derrida calls, the need to switch between strategies, comes into its own. For positivity 
and affirmation is needed above all to combat the worst of negations. Otherwise we are in 
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danger of colonizing negativity and reactive attitudes ourselves, and there is not much worse 
than that. 
If you do manage to have your words taken seriously, you are liable to be dubbed 
aggressive, threatening, castrating, so that you will sometimes be called upon to perform a 
dance, a dance not unlike that of McDonald’s maverick, appeasing, soothing and assuaging, 
even as you remain determined, forthright and hold yourself to high principles. You play the 
maternal, acquiescent, feminine role, even as you try with all your remaining might to pursue 
your own goals, to carve out your own path, you own career, to keep on writing and 
publishing, to keep on teaching well, to keep performing your job as a manager calmly, with 
humanity and empathy, with fairness and integrity. 
 You will see the politics of sexism, transphobia, racism, and ableism play out every 
day in the classroom and in the corridors of academe. By and large, female, lgbtq, and 
minority professors who have been able to rise up the ranks will perform the vast majority of 
pastoral care. You will be the ones that students approach, and you will be happy to do it, you 
will be called to do it, but even as you are doing it, your male, white, heteronormative, 
cisgender colleagues will be at their desks or in their houses, researching and writing their 
books and their papers, relaxing and enjoying life, having a drink, and you will not be. You 
will spend much of your time mopping up the messes they have left in their wake, for they 
have not, for the most part, been taught to deal with all those messy affects very well, so 
while the boys are off doing what boys do you will be depleted and exhausted, sometimes on 
their behalf, and you will lack the time and energy to think, write and work. 
This symbolic and affective economy is real and tangible. It is the subtext, the 
lifeblood of our neo-liberal institutions, but remains for the most part invisible and unspoken, 
even as it sustains them, feeding and nourishing universities as they become increasingly 
centralised, dehumanising, depersonalising, and bureaucratic. Sapping our energies and 
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exhausting our very souls, measuring our outputs, and quantifying the words we publish, 
universities penalize women and minorities, who remain the lowest paid, and the harshest 
judged. 
 We cannot afford to stop doing the work of exposing and publicizing the real 
inequalities that remain invisible and ignored for the most part. This is why Derrida is right to 
call for the constant and incessant interchange of gestures. We still need to attend to and 
perform gestures of equality, even as we show that they do not go far enough, that we need to 
beyond them. How, then, do we go beyond them even as we keep making these gestures?  
You will find your own way, but here are some of the strategies I, along with a few 
friends, have found to be life affirming strategies that have made it possible to go on, even in 
the darkest times. You will conquer with the brightest splashes of colour, you will not stop 
running, you will bounce up and down on trampolines, higher and higher until you rise above 
the black, ornate, iron railings, and your head is in the trees, nearly in the clouds, you will 
walk coastlines and rivers, the contours of which you will allow to define the tempo and 
mood of your journey. You will swim and you will cycle, and no one can stop you, nothing 
will get in your way, you will twirl around and around, you will dance and nothing will still 
your feet, nothing can stem the energy of your pen, as you write your way through the world. 
You will love and you will live with friends who understand the importance of dancing 
through the world, who know that the steps of the dance matter, when they are taken and for 
whom, for what purpose and with what end, in what rhythm and at the behest of which 
choreographer.  
 You will spend your days and your life not with people whose energy is negative, 
repressive, and reactive, you will find a way to surround yourself with people who 
understand the joy of life, and it will be infectious, and soon everyone who wants to will be 
dancing along with you. You will address discrimination and marginalization wherever you 
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find it, not just in gendered spaces but in racialized, classed and transphobic spaces in any 
way you can. You will teach yourself to recognize it, you will do the work it takes not just to 
recognize it, but to act on it, and to change the terms of recognition, and when you fail, and 
you will fail, you will not give up, you will try again and again, until your failures do not 
predominate. This matrix of reworking, this space of the choreographies that will take shape 
is a non-place, and one of the names that has been given to it is khôra. 
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